R E P O R T

Civil Death in Practice

A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF TURKEY'S POST-2016 PURGES

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Civil Death in Practice: A Legal and Empirical Assessment of Turkey's Post-2016 Purges

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INTRODUCTION

On the night of 15 July 2016, a faction of the Turkish Armed Forces attempted to seize power by force. The attempt failed within hours. What followed, however, endured for nearly a decade, and continues to this day.

In the days after the coup attempt, Turkey declared a State of Emergency and began issuing a series of emergency decree laws — Kanun Hükmünde Kararnameler, known by the acronym KHK — that would, over the course of twenty-four months, reshape the country's legal, institutional, and social landscape beyond recognition. By the time the State of Emergency was formally lifted in July 2018, thirty-two such decrees had been enacted. Through them, 162,239 civil servants — teachers, judges, prosecutors, doctors, academics, police officers, engineers, and many others — were dismissed from public service by executive act, without charge, without hearing, and without any individualised determination of wrongdoing.

As the tenth anniversary of the night of 15 July approaches, a different and more troubling question demands attention: what has happened to those 162,239 people since? That question is the subject of this report.

The Italian Federation for Human Rights publishes this study in the conviction that the passage of time does not diminish a human rights violation — it compounds it. The violations documented in the existing record were imposed in 2016, 2017, and 2018. What this report documents is their persistence in 2025: the same exclusions, the same stigma, the same foreclosed futures, still in force a decade on, long after the formal emergency ended, long after many of those dismissed were acquitted in the very criminal proceedings launched against them, and long after the legal architecture that produced the purges was itself subjected to international condemnation.

The report draws on two bodies of material. The first is doctrinal and legal: Chapter I reconstructs the architecture of the emergency regime, analysing the thirty-two Emergency Decrees, the direct and indirect consequences of dismissal, and the concept of "civil death" — the condition in which an individual formally retains citizenship but is, in practice, excluded from the legal, economic, and social order through a dense web of permanent and stigmatising disabilities. The second is empirical: Chapter II presents the findings of a structured survey completed by 1,629 people dismissed under Emergency Decrees, conducted between October and November 2025. Together, the two chapters map what neither the legal record nor the individual case can do alone: the scale, the texture, and the endurance of the harm.

The findings are stark. Almost two-thirds of respondents could not find formally insured employment after their dismissal. More than seventy percent had applications rejected or were dismissed from posts specifically because of their KHK status. More than half encountered the administrative blacklisting code "36/OHAL/KHK" — a designation that follows dismissed individuals across every state database, every hiring process, every financial transaction, functioning not as a legal penalty but as something more insidious: a permanent, automated stigma that requires no official to act in bad faith and offers no clear point of contestation. On average, respondents reported experiencing 3.6 distinct forms of discrimination across the thirty catalogued in the survey — in employment, finance, healthcare, education, welfare, and civic life, simultaneously, and sustained over years. Nearly three in ten reported that their spouses or children, holding no KHK status of their own, had been made to share their exclusion.

These are not the aftershocks of a crisis. They are its ongoing structure.

The Italian Federation for Human Rights has long maintained that the protection of human rights is not served by documentation alone but requires sustained attention to the lived conditions of those whose rights have been violated. Turkey's post-2016 purges have been examined extensively as a legal and institutional phenomenon. What has received far less attention — and what this report addresses — is what those purges continue to mean in practice for the more than one hundred and sixty thousand people subjected to them, and for the families drawn into their orbit. As the tenth anniversary of the coup attempt approaches, that question is no longer only a matter of historical record. It is a matter of present accountability.

Antonio Stango
President, Italian Federation for Human Rights – FIDU

CHAPTER I

On July 15, 2016, a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces attempted to overthrow the constitutional order by force. The events, which have never been adequately investigated, resulted in at least 246 deaths and more than 2,000 injuries.

On July 20, 2016, a State of Emergency was declared, pursuant to Articles 120 and 121 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution (as was in force at the time) and Law No. 2935, on the State of Emergency. Simultaneously, Turkey lodged derogation notices with the United Nations and the Council of Europe under Article 4 ICCPR and Article 15 ECHR, thereby activating the exceptional regime of human rights limitation that is recognized under international law.

Under both instruments, four cumulative conditions govern lawful derogation:

1. The existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation;
2. Official proclamation and notification;
3. Measures strictly required by the exigencies of the situation;
4. Consistency with other obligations under international law, including the prohibition of discrimination and respect for non-derogable rights.

Although Turkey formally complied with the notification requirement, the subsequent emergency regime rapidly exceeded the logic of temporary crisis management and evolved into a comprehensive system of governance by decree, which was characterised by weak parliamentary scrutiny, severely constrained judicial review, and the transformation of exceptional powers into permanent structural reforms.

Between July 2016 and July 2018, the State of Emergency was extended seven times, thus remaining in force for a total of twenty-four months. During this period, thirty-two emergency decree laws (Kanun Hükmünde Kararnameler, KHKs) were enacted, profoundly reshaping the legal order and targeting vast segments of society.

These thirty-two Emergency Decrees constituted the central legal instrument of post-coup governance. They displayed three structural features that are of particular relevance from a rule-of-law perspective.

a. Ad hominem and Collective Nature

Rather than formulating abstract and general norms, seventeen of the thirty-two decrees annexed lists of named individuals and institutions to be dismissed, closed, or confiscated[1]. No individualised reasoning, evidentiary assessment, or adversarial procedure accompanied these decisions. Sanctions were imposed on the basis of broadly worded formulas, such as "membership, affiliation, connection, or contact" with organizations that were deemed to threaten national security, without there being either statutory definitions or judicially reviewable criteria.

[1] Emergency Decrees Nos. 667, 668, 669, 670, 672, 673, 675, 677, 679, 683, 686, 689, 692, 693, 695, 697, 701.

At the end of the State of Emergency regime, in July 2018, the Turkish parliament passed a law (no.7145) that extended the government's summary dismissal authority until July 2021; this deadline was later extended until July 2022, with Law no. 7333.

b. Permanence of Effects

Although adopted under a temporary emergency regime, the measures produced irreversible legal consequences: lifetime bans from public service, dissolution of legal entities, confiscation of assets, and professional disqualifications that continued long after the formal end of the State of Emergency in July 2018. This permanence contradicts the inherently temporary logic of derogation under Article 15 ECHR and Article 4 ICCPR.

c. Marginalisation of Judicial Review

For a significant period, the Turkish Constitutional Court declined to review Emergency Decrees, considering them to be acts of government that were immune from constitutional scrutiny. Ordinary courts similarly treated the annexe lists as being binding and non-justiciable. Although the State of Emergency Inquiry Commission was later established, its limited independence, protracted procedures, and the extremely low number of successful applications failed to satisfy the requirements of an "effective remedy" under Article 13 ECHR and Article 2(3) ICCPR.

d. Mass Dismissals of Public Servants

One of the most far-reaching consequences of the emergency regime was the collective dismissal of public officials, including healthcare personnel, academics, teachers, police officers, military personnel, and civil servants of all ranks.

According to a recent statement, made in the Turkish parliament, a total of 162,239 civil servants were targeted with emergency decrees and subsequent summary dismissal under the authority of the Turkish government.[2]

These dismissals were justified by alleged "links" to terrorist organisations, primarily the Gülen Movement, but were executed without criminal convictions, individualised evidence, or adversarial hearings. From the standpoint of international human rights law, this practice raises serious concerns under the following:

- Article 6 ECHR / Article 14 ICCPR (fair trial, presumption of innocence, and procedural guarantees),
- Article 8 ECHR / Article 17 ICCPR (private life, reputation, professional identity),
- Article 14 ECHR / Article 26 ICCPR (non-discrimination),
- Article 7 ECHR / Article 15 ICCPR (the principle of legality).

[2] https://www.odakgazetesi.com/milletvekili-ozkaya-khk-surecleri-hukuk-devleti-ilkeleri-cercevesinde-yurutuldu

Scholarly analysis concludes that the Turkish authorities adopted a "shotgun approach" to purges, conflating administrative loyalty screening with punitive sanctions of a quasi-criminal nature, thereby circumventing the safeguards that are applicable to criminal proceedings while inflicting comparable stigmatising and exclusionary effects.

Direct Consequences of the Emergency Dismissals

Dismissed public servants were subjected to a complex web of automatic and permanent sanctions, including:

- Lifetime exclusion from all public service;
- Cancellation of passports and professional licenses;
- Deprivation of ranks, titles, and medals;
- Eviction from public housing;
- Bans on employment in private security, education, health, and other regulated sectors.

These measures were imposed, not as individualised disciplinary penalties but as the collective consequences of inclusion on annexe lists to Decree Laws, thus operating outside the ordinary standards of proportionality and due process.

Indirect Consequences of Emergency Dismissals

Beyond their immediate legal effects, the emergency dismissals generated a condition that has been widely described as "civil death." A 2022 report published by the Arrested Lawyers Initiative documents thirty types of discriminations that dismissed public servants and their family members have been subjected.[3]

a. Indirect Consequences and the Notion of "Civil Death"

Beyond the immediate legal effects of dismissals, the Turkish emergency regime generated a dense network of secondary and tertiary consequences that, collectively, produced what may be described, in both sociological and legal-theoretical terms, as a condition of *civil death*. This concept, which is historically associated with the total loss of civil status in pre-modern legal systems, is analytically useful in capturing a situation in which individuals formally retain citizenship yet are, in practice, excluded from the legal, economic, and social order through a web of permanent and stigmatising disabilities.

[3] No Country for Purge Victims, https://arrestedlawyers.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/36-ohal-khk-no-country-for-purge-victims.pdf

FIGURE 1 · SCOPE OF DOCUMENTED DEPRIVATIONS

28 Documented Forms of Deprivation

Each circle represents one form of deprivation or discrimination still in effect against purged civil servants.



No Country for Purge Victims Source: No Country for Purge Victims (report) · Each circle = one documented deprivation still in effect

b. Administrative Blacklisting and Social Erasure

A central mechanism of this indirect exclusion was the systematic administrative marking of dismissed persons in state databases. Individuals who were purged under Emergency Decrees were coded with the designation “36/OHAL/KHK” in the records of the Social Security Institution and the Turkish Employment Agency. This coding was not merely informational; it functioned as an automated warning signal to all public and private employers that the person had been removed from office on the grounds of alleged terrorist affiliation.

FIGURE 2 · ADMINISTRATIVE BLACKLISTING MECHANISM

From Single Act to Permanent Stigma

How the 36/OHAL/KHK designation cascades into lifelong exclusion across every domain of civil life.



No Country for Purge Victims Source: No Country for Purge Victims (report)

In effect, this transformed a single administrative act into a lifelong, omnipresent stigma. Access to employment in the private sector—which is formally unrestricted by law—became practically impossible, as employers were deterred by the visible state label that implied that the person applying for employment was a security risk and a political liability. The result was a form of invisible but pervasive civil disqualification, operating without court judgment, without temporal limitation and without any mechanism for rehabilitation.

From a human rights perspective, this system interferes with:

- The right to respect for private life and reputation (Article 8 ECHR; Article 17 ICCPR),
- The right to work and to freely choose one's profession (Article 6 ICESCR; Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR, in its property dimension),
- and the prohibition of discrimination on political or other status (Article 14 ECHR; Article 26 ICCPR).

The blacklisting regime thus created a permanent *status offence*, which is incompatible with the principle that legal consequences must be individualised, proportionate and time-bound.

c. Professional Exclusion and De-Qualification

The indirect effects of emergency dismissals extended far beyond public employment. A wide range of regulatory bodies and ministries adopted secondary measures barring purged individuals from professions in the private sector, including:

- Law (the refusal of bar admission and internships),
- Education (including the denial of teaching licenses, even in private driving schools, and the denial of licenses to drive school buses)
- Medicine and occupational safety,
- Engineering, architecture and building inspection,
- Accounting and financial consultancy,
- Maritime professions and aviation.

FIGURE 3 · PROFESSIONAL EXCLUSION

Every Profession a Closed Door

Professions barred by secondary measures — based solely on Emergency Decree listing, not judicial finding.



No Country for Purge Victims Source: No Country for Purge Victims (report) · Each red dot = one deprivation still in effect

These prohibitions were not based on judicial findings of professional misconduct or criminal conviction but solely on the fact of having been listed in an Emergency Decree. Even acquittal or termination of criminal proceedings did not restore professional eligibility. The emergency dismissal thus operated as an irreversible professional death sentence.

Legally, this constitutes violations of the principle of proportionality and of the right to pursue a profession and amounts to a form of *collective professional ban* that is incompatible with Article 6 and Article 8 ECHR, as well as with the ILO conventions on employment discrimination. The absence of any individualised risk assessment or of the possibility of

review reinforces the conclusion that these measures functioned by being punitive in nature while they were shielded from criminal law guarantees.

d. Political and Civic Exclusion

The condition of civil death was further deepened by restrictions on political participation. Decisions of the High Election Board, together with administrative practice, prevented dismissed individuals from holding elected local office, even when their candidacies had been formally accepted and they had won democratic elections. This severed the link between citizenship and political agency, undermining the essence of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR and of Article 25 ICCPR.

FIGURE 4 · POLITICAL & CIVIC EXCLUSION

Civil, Travel & Relief Restrictions

Passport cancellations, military discrimination and exclusion from civic life produce a condition of internal civic exile.

XV · TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

Cannot obtain passports

Purged public servants are discriminated against in obtaining passports and travel documents.

XVI · BANKING & FINANCE

Cannot open bank accounts

Excluded from financial transactions, insurance services, and business development credits.

XVII · MILITARY SERVICE & TAXATION

Discriminated in military & tax matters

Face discriminatory treatment in mandatory military service obligations and taxation.

XXIII · DISASTER & COVID RELIEF

Excluded from COVID-19 and disaster aid

Purged public servants are discriminated against in COVID-19 relief and natural disaster aid.

No Country for Purge Victims

Source: No Country for Purge Victims (report)

Combined with passport cancellations and travel bans, these measures produced a form of internal civic exile: physically, individuals remained within the territory, yet they were deprived of meaningful participation in public life and professional activity and also of social recognition.

e. Family and Social Spill-Over Effects

Civil death, under the emergency regime, was not confined to the individual. It radiated outward to spouses, children, and extended family members through:

- The loss of social security and health insurance,
- Denial of a range of social benefits, including those provided to disabled persons and disaster victims,
- Obstacles to education and scholarships,
- Obstacles to employment in public sector jobs and other regulated professions,
- Social stigmatisation and informal surveillance,

- The removal of foster children from families on security grounds.

FIGURE 5 · FAMILY & SOCIAL SPILL-OVER EFFECTS

Civil Death Radiates to the Family

Restrictions affecting the dismissed individual (inner ring) and those extending to spouse, children and dependants (outer ring).



No Country for Purge Victims Source: No Country for Purge Victims (report)

This collective impact contravenes the principle of personal criminal responsibility and the protection of family life under Article 8 ECHR and Article 17 ICCPR. It also reflects a logic of *guilt by association*, one in which proximity to a stigmatised individual becomes itself a source of legal and social disadvantage.

Theoretical Framing: Emergency Law and Civil Death

In classical legal history, civil death (mort civile) denoted the loss of legal personality in feudal and early modern systems. In contemporary constitutional theory, it has re-emerged as a metaphor through which to describe situations in which the state, without formally stripping people of their citizenship, deprives such individuals of the practical capacity to exercise civil, political, and socio-economic rights.

The Turkish post-coup regime fits this pattern in three respects:

1. **Status Transformation** – Emergency dismissal created a new, inferior legal status, one that is defined not by conduct that has been proven in court but by administrative suspicion.

2. **Permanence** – The effects were not temporary emergency restrictions but lifelong exclusions, ones that were incompatible with the temporary nature of derogation.
3. **Totalisation** – The combination of employment bans, professional prohibitions, political exclusion, and social stigma produced a comprehensive marginalisation, not isolated interferences.

This reveals a shift from emergency law that is a tool of constitutional self-defense, to emergency law that is an instrument of *status re-engineering*, thus producing a legally constructed 'out-group' among the citizenry.

Compatibility with Derogation Law

Even under Article 15 ECHR and Article 4 ICCPR, derogation cannot justify:

- The permanent destruction of civil status,
- Blanket professional bans that are detached from individualized necessity,
- The stigmatising of registries that foreclose social reintegration,
- Or measures that undermine the essence of human dignity.

The notion of "civil death" thus captures the core legal pathology of the post-coup purge system: a regime in which emergency powers were used not merely to neutralise an imminent threat, but also to impose enduring civic exclusion on a broad and loosely defined category of persons, in a manner that is incompatible with the principles of necessity, proportionality, legality, and the rule of law.

Critical Assessment under International Human Rights Law

The dominant critique among international doctrine and monitoring bodies converges on four points:

a. Excess of Necessity and Proportionality

While the coup attempt justified extraordinary measures against those who were directly involved, the breadth of the purges, the vagueness of the criteria ("contact" and "affiliation"), and the extension of sanctions to hundreds of thousands of individuals by using tenuous or unproven links failed the "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" test under Article 15 ECHR and Article 4 ICCPR.

b. Collective Punishment and Guilt by Association

The decrees institutionalised a model of liability that is based on organisational proximity, rather than on personal conduct, thus undermining the principle of individual criminal responsibility and the presumption of innocence.

c. Permanence of Exceptional Measures

By transforming emergency dismissals, closures and professional bans into irreversible statuses, the Turkish authorities blurred the line between temporary derogation and structural constitutional transformation, thereby “normalising the state of emergency” .

d. Deficit of Effective Remedies

The lack of timely, independent, and adversarial judicial review rendered the derogation regime incompatible with the minimum procedural guarantees that must subsist, even in times of public emergency.

Conclusion: From Emergency to Authoritarian Constitutionalism

In sum, the post-2016 emergency regime in Turkey illustrates how a formally lawful derogation, initially grounded in a genuine existential crisis, can evolve into a comprehensive system of rule by exception. Through the 32 Emergency Decrees, the mass dismissal of public servants, and the creation of a *de facto* status of “civil death," the State of Emergency ceased to function as a temporary mechanism of constitutional self-defense and, instead, became an instrument of structural, political re-engineering.

From the standpoint of international human rights law, the Turkish case demonstrates the fragility of the derogation framework when judicial oversight is weakened, parliamentary control marginalised, and proportionality replaced by collective suspicion. It stands as a paradigmatic example of how emergency powers, once normalised and made permanent, corrode the very foundations of legality, equality, and human dignity that derogation clauses are meant to preserve.

The legal and human rights implications of the dismissals that were carried out under the State of Emergency Decrees (Statutory Decrees—KHKs) in Turkey have been extensively documented and analysed in numerous international reports, judicial decisions, and scholarly publications. These sources have made a detailed examination of the arbitrary nature of the purges, the lack of effective remedies, and their lack of compliance with both the Turkish Constitution and international human rights treaties, like the ECHR and ICCPR.

Far less is known, however, about how these measures continue to shape the daily lives of those affected nearly a decade later. The legal remedies that do exist operate on an individual basis: a person lodges an application, and a judgment is rendered in that single case. Yet the violations at issue are not isolated incidents but a mass phenomenon, experienced in parallel by tens of thousands of people. Individual adjudication, by its very design, vindicates the applicant before it while leaving the collective scale of the harm largely invisible. The doctrinal picture is well established and the case law accumulates one applicant at a time; the empirical picture, how widespread and how enduring these effects are across the affected population, is not. It is this persistence and prevalence, the lived reality of 'civil death' shared by many thousands long after the formal end of the State of Emergency, that the present study sets out to examine.

CHAPTER II

Survey

Against this background, and almost ten years after the mass dismissals, the present study sets out to assess empirically how KHK-based exclusion continues to shape the lives of dismissed individuals and their families, with particular attention to structural discrimination and social marginalisation. To this end, a structured questionnaire was designed, comprising eleven core questions together with a checklist of thirty predefined forms of discrimination. The core questions addressed, *inter alia*, the specific Decree under which the respondent was dismissed, their profession and length of public service, their exposure to criminal investigation or prosecution, whether first-degree relatives had also been dismissed, access to formal employment and social security after dismissal, and discrimination in accessing public services. Several were paired with an optional open-ended prompt: for instance, ' *Have you encountered the code "36/OHAL/KHK" in any public institution? If yes, could you briefly explain in what context?'* allowing respondents to describe specific incidents in their own words. The final item asked respondents to indicate which of thirty listed forms of discrimination they had experienced, with space to describe any treatment not captured by the list. The full questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix A.

The survey was conducted online, via Google Forms, between 13 October and 4 November 2025. Respondents were recruited through networks of dismissed individuals and social media channels used by those affected, and a total of 1,629 people dismissed under Emergency Decrees completed the questionnaire. As a self-selected sample reached through these channels, the respondent pool is not statistically representative of the dismissed population as a whole, and the figures reported below should be read as indicative of the patterns and lived experiences of those affected rather than as precise population-level estimates. That said, against a total of approximately 162,239 people dismissed under Emergency Decrees, a sample of this size offers a substantial empirical window onto the long-term, multidimensional consequences of the purges — and, as the findings show, the persistence of legal, economic and social exclusion nearly a decade after the initial measures were imposed.

A note on method is warranted. The survey is not a representative sample of the dismissed population, and the figures reported below are not offered as population-level estimates of how many of the 162,239 affected individuals experienced any given measure; as a self-selected sample, it cannot support inferences of that kind. What a sample of this size can establish is the existence, recurrence and texture of the patterns it documents. When hundreds of respondents independently report the same mechanisms — the Code 36 designation surfacing in unrelated transactions, offers withdrawn upon disclosure of KHK status, relatives swept up in parallel — the evidentiary value lies not in precise proportions but in showing that these are systematic and widely shared phenomena rather than isolated grievances. In this respect the survey complements the individualised logic of judicial remedies: where a court judgment establishes a violation in a single case, the survey evidences the scale and repetition of comparable violations across a large body of affected persons.

Findings

Among 1,629 people dismissed under Turkey's post-2016 state-of-emergency decrees — part of 162,239 dismissed nationwide:

70.9% rejected from jobs or fired once their KHK status became known

62.3% denied a passport or travel document

52.9% found the "36/OHAL/KHK" blacklist code attached to their records

35.7% had a parent, sibling, spouse or child also purged

32.2% acquitted, yet never reinstated to public service

Source: online survey, 13 October – 4 November 2025.

The findings below draw on the 1,629 people who completed the survey. Before turning to their experiences of exclusion, it is worth establishing who they are. A self-selected sample cannot tell us what the dismissed population as a whole looks like; the aim here is narrower—to show that these respondents form a broad cross-section of it. As the profile makes clear, respondents were dismissed under many different decrees, came from across different parts of the public sector, and spanned every stage of a public-service career. This breadth matters: it means the patterns of exclusion documented in the following sections are not the grievance of a single professional group but recur across people whose only shared characteristic is having been removed under an Emergency Decree.

a. Distribution by Decree



Share of 1,629 respondents, by dismissal decree

Respondents reported dismissal under a wide range of Emergency Decrees, with KHK No. 672 alone accounting for more than a third of the sample. This pattern reflects the wave-like character of the purge, in which large numbers were removed simultaneously through annexed lists rather than through individualised procedures.

One decree warrants particular attention. KHK No. 375, cited by 15% of respondents, matters beyond its frequency: its provisional Article 35 supplied the legal mechanism that allowed summary dismissals to continue after the formal end of the State of Emergency in July 2018—converting an exceptional power into a standing administrative practice, as discussed in Chapter I. The specific shares here describe respondents, not all those dismissed nationally; "HSK" denotes measures relating to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors.

b. Profession



Share of 1,629 respondents, by profession at dismissal

The respondents came from across different parts of the public sector. Teachers form the largest single group, followed by police and military personnel—a profile that broadly mirrors the sectors most heavily affected nationally, lending the sample a measure of face validity. Yet the reach extends well beyond education and security: judges, prosecutors, court clerks, academics, engineers, doctors, and a substantial body of other civil servants—technicians, tax and customs officers, chaplains, and others—are all represented, alongside smaller numbers of district governors and inspectors. The spread is itself the finding: as reflected in this sample, the purge was confined to no single profession or institution.

c. Length of Service

Respondents were, for the most part, established public servants rather than recent entrants. The majority had served between six and twenty years at the time of dismissal, and only a small minority had served fewer than five. The dismissals therefore represented not merely an administrative reshuffle but the removal of accumulated professional experience—and they reached people at every stage of a career.

d. What the profile establishes

Read together, these characteristics are best understood not as a measurement of the purged population but as evidence of the sample's breadth. Respondents were dismissed under different decrees, drawn from different professions, and removed at different career stages, and yet, as the following sections show, they report strikingly convergent experiences of exclusion. It is that convergence across a heterogeneous group, rather than any single proportion, that gives the findings their weight.

e. Criminal Investigation and Prosecution

For most respondents, dismissal was not the end of the matter but the beginning of a criminal process. A large majority—around 85%—reported being subjected to a criminal investigation, a prosecution, or both; only about one in seven faced no criminal process at all. Yet exposure to the criminal justice system rarely produced a finding of guilt.



Among those who reported the outcome of their proceedings, conviction was the single most common result, but it accounted for fewer than two in five. Taken together, the outcomes that established no criminal liability, such as acquittal, dismissal of the charges, and decisions not to prosecute outnumbered convictions, reaching nearly half of all reported cases, while a further tenth remained unresolved at the time of the survey. The criminal process that followed the purge, in other words, overwhelmingly failed to substantiate the terrorism-related suspicions on which the dismissals had rested.

That it should do so is bound up with the logic of the Emergency Decrees themselves. By designating broad categories of people as affiliated with a terrorist organisation, the decrees furnished courts and prosecutors with a ready-made basis for treating individuals as objects of "reasonable suspicion," a designation that, in practice, licensed investigation, prosecution, and, frequently, the deprivation of liberty, well before and often regardless of any judicial finding.

f. Detained and prosecuted, then cleared

The cost of this dynamic is starkest among those who were eventually acquitted.

Among acquitted respondents who volunteered the detail

9 days – 2 years
in pre-trial detention, before acquittal

4 – 9 years
the length of criminal proceedings

Durations were volunteered, not asked, and are not comparable across groups.

These figures come from respondents who happened to mention their detention or trial length in open-text answers; duration was not itself a survey question, so they are illustrative rather than systematic and cannot be set against any comparison group. They are striking all the same: people held for many months, or prosecuted for the better part of a decade, before any charge against them was made out. The full set of durations respondents volunteered is reproduced in Appendix B.

> **P723**
> Held two years in pre-trial detention, then acquitted.

> **P855 & P866**
> Prosecuted for roughly nine years, then acquitted.

Detention and prosecution of this length, imposed on people against whom no liability was ultimately established, raise acute concerns under the right to liberty and the right to be tried within a reasonable time (Articles 5 and 6 ECHR). Where pre-trial detention runs to months or years and ends in acquittal, it ceases to function as a precautionary measure and begins to operate as a punishment in its own right.

g. Acquittal without reinstatement

The most consequential finding of this section, however, is what acquittal did *not* achieve. Clearing one's name in the criminal courts did not restore one's position: respondents who were acquitted, or whose charges were dismissed, remained permanently dismissed from public service all the same. The administrative purge and the criminal process ran on separate tracks, and a favourable outcome on the second did nothing to undo the first. This is the structural fact behind the figure with which this chapter opened, that nearly a third of respondents were acquitted, yet never reinstated.

For some, the ordeal did not even end there. A number of respondents reported being subjected to a *second* investigation or prosecution, resting on substantially the same allegations, after an

earlier acquittal or decision not to prosecute, exposed once more to the process they had already survived.

h. Employment and Economic Exclusion

For those removed under the Emergency Decrees, dismissal rarely meant simply the loss of a job. It meant exclusion from the formal economy itself. Two findings set the scene: almost two-thirds of respondents (65.3%) reported being unable to find any socially insured employment after their dismissal, and 70.9% reported that their applications had been rejected or that they had been let go from a post, specifically because of their KHK status.



Number of rejections, among 913 respondents who gave a specific figure

Most respondents who gave a figure reported only a handful of rejections. Read as a sign of easy access, that number misleads. The qualitative responses make clear that many in the lowest band stopped applying after a few attempts, having concluded the outcome was foregone; their low count reflects withdrawal from the labour market, not success within it. At the other extreme, dozens of respondents could no longer put a number on it at all, reporting that they had been turned away "countless" times. Between these poles lay a single, consistent experience: rejection that respondents attributed not to their qualifications but to their status.

i. How exclusion worked

The open-text accounts describe a recognisable set of mechanisms, recurring across professions and regions.

> I'm an engineering graduate, but for years my applications were rejected because my dismissal surfaces when employers Google my name. I survived by selling my belongings and giving private lessons.
> *— a dismissed engineer*

> I was accepted by every job I applied to, until I told them I'd been dismissed under a decree. Then they gave up on hiring me.

> I even applied for a porter's job, and they wouldn't take me: 'we'll have problems with the paperwork.'

The starting point was visibility. A dismissal under an Emergency Decree was legible to employers, whether through social-security (SGK) records that carried the dismissal code or through a simple internet search that surfaced the news. Once visible, KHK status frequently operated as an automatic disqualifier. Respondents described recruitment processes that had been progressing well and ended abruptly the moment their status was disclosed; others were hired and then let go within days or weeks once the dismissal came to light through registration or an external warning.

Behind much of this lay employer fear rather than any judgement on the applicant. Respondents repeatedly reported being told, in effect, that they were capable but unhireable: that the employer could not risk the inspections, lost contracts, or scrutiny that association with a KHK-dismissed person might bring. Where work was offered at all, it was often informal and uninsured, on terms that exposed workers to low pay and exploitation. Many were pushed into undeclared, low-skilled jobs far below their qualifications, and highly trained professionals reported being unable to secure even manual or entry-level positions, again on the ground of the paperwork their status would entail.

The barriers were not only attitudinal. For many, the loss or refusal of professional licences and credentials closed off whole occupations regardless of any individual employer's willingness to hire. The exclusion was reinforced by stigma: respondents described being treated as dangerous, contaminated, or criminal; their KHK status equated in everyday encounters with terrorism. Some concealed their status in order to work at all, a strategy that bought employment at the price of constant insecurity.

k. Exclusion that outlasted acquittal

This economic exclusion did not track criminal guilt. Of the respondents who had been acquitted or had their cases dropped, nearly two-thirds still could not find insured work, and more than two-thirds reported having applications rejected or being dismissed because of their status. Being cleared in court did little to reopen the labour market. The barrier was the administrative fact of the dismissal, not any judicial finding, and it persisted independently of one.

Taken together, these accounts describe something other than unemployment. They describe structural exclusion from formal economic life: occupational downgrading, forced informality, exploitation, and a long, grinding loss of professional standing that continued years after the original measure.

1. Administrative Marking: The "Code 36" Blacklist

Much of the exclusion described so far operated through a single administrative mechanism: a marker, known as code "36/OHAL/KHK," attached to the records of those dismissed under the Emergency Decrees. More than half of respondents (52.9%) reported encountering it.

> When we went to withdraw the gold we'd kept at Bank Asya, our name had been flagged at the new bank too, and we couldn't get it back.

> It still shows in my SGK records. At the land registry I can't transfer property: there is no lien against me, yet I have been entered as a 'problematic person' and blacklisted.

> My credit-card and loan applications are constantly rejected.

The code's function is to signal, within state databases, that a person was removed from office on grounds of alleged terrorist affiliation. Its significance lies in what that signal does. Held in the records of the Social Security Institution (SGK) and the employment agency (İŞKUR), it is visible to prospective employers and, as the previous section showed, converts a past dismissal into a present, automated warning that follows the individual into every formal hiring process.

Its reach extends well beyond employment. Respondents encountered the marking, or its equivalents, across the administrative state. They described banks refusing loans, credit, or routine transactions; money transfers from relatives or assistance funds withheld; and difficulty even opening an account. They described being recorded as a "problematic person" in land-registry dealings, despite the absence of any formal lien or restriction. The same flagging logic appeared in other systems: respondents reported being listed as "suspicious persons" by the notaries' union and within the land-registry system (TAKBİS) and marked in the social-assistance database (SOYBİS) in ways that obstructed access to welfare.

What emerges is less a single code than a web of interlocking designations that travel with the individual across institutions. Because the marking operates automatically and carries no judicial annotation, it produces an exclusion that requires no official to act in bad faith and gives the individual no clear point at which to contest it. The cumulative effect is a form of digital stigmatisation: an administrative status that reproduces suspicion and differential treatment at every encounter with the state, long after the original dismissal and wholly detached from any criminal finding.

m. The Reach of Discrimination

Asked directly whether they had faced discrimination in accessing public services because of their KHK status, just under half of respondents (48%) said yes. Striking on its own, the figure becomes more revealing when set against what respondents had been through in the criminal courts.



Discrimination barely moved with criminal status. Whether a respondent had been through a full prosecution, an investigation alone, or no criminal process whatsoever, the share reporting discrimination held close to half, and those never investigated reported it slightly more often than those who had been prosecuted. The implication matters: this treatment did not follow from anything a court or prosecutor had found. It attached to the administrative fact of the dismissal itself, the same KHK status that the marking system kept permanently visible.

Asked to describe that discrimination in their own words, respondents pointed most often to the denial of social assistance and welfare benefits, raised more frequently than any other form (some 241 times): exclusion from disaster relief, COVID-19 support, low-income schemes, and aid for the victims of terrorism. Discrimination in general access to public services came next (around 192 mentions), followed by exclusion from skills- and profession-building programs (about 100), healthcare (82, including cases involving cancer patients and people with disabilities), and banking and insurance (54). A long tail of less frequent but serious accounts ran through scholarships, disability benefits, freedom of movement, education, student housing, tax treatment, unemployment benefit, pensions, and in one case a refused adoption. These are volunteered open-text mentions rather than counts from a fixed list, but their weight points clearly towards the denial of social protection as the discrimination respondents felt most acutely.

If that open question captured how discrimination was experienced, a further question mapped its full shape. Respondents were shown a list of thirty specific forms and asked which they had encountered.



Share of 1,629 respondents, multiple answers permitted

The result is a portrait of exclusion touching nearly every domain of public life. The single most common experience, reported by more than six in ten respondents, was the denial of a passport or travel document. Close behind came the Code 36 blacklisting described earlier, discrimination in banking and finance, and exclusion from private-sector education. For the academics and researchers among the respondents, that passport denial was more than a mobility restriction; it severed access to conferences, fellowships, and postgraduate study abroad, functioning as a form of professional isolation. Below these sit dozens of further bars, spanning professional licensing, health and disability benefits, pandemic and disaster relief, social assistance, military service, political office, and academic life. One of these was underwritten by an explicit legal instrument: the High Election Board's decision of 10 April 2019 (No. 2019/2363) barred those dismissed under the decrees from standing for elected local office, whether as mayor, municipal council member, or village headman (*muhtar*), in some cases after their candidacies had already been accepted. Taken together, the checklist reaches

well beyond the narrow question of public services into professional, financial, and civic life, which is why its leading figures run higher than the general rate noted above.

Three features of the chart deserve emphasis. Several forms could plausibly be classed under more than one heading; each has been assigned to a single domain for clarity. Because respondents could select as many as applied, the figures sum to well over 100%. And because 237 respondents (14.6%) reported a form not on the list, even thirty categories do not exhaust the field.

That breadth is matched by its depth in any single life.



Among 1,629 respondents; domain counts based on the primary category assigned to each form.

Respondents did not, by and large, meet one barrier in isolation. On average they reported 3.6 of the thirty forms, and more than half were excluded across three or more distinct domains of life at once. This simultaneity is the empirical substance of the "civil death" described in Chapter I: not a single closed door, but exclusion from employment, finance, welfare, and civic participation together, sustained over years.

n. Punished by Association

The purge did not stop at the individual dismissed. It ran outward through families.

More than a third of respondents (35.7%) reported that a first-degree relative had also been dismissed under an Emergency Decree.



Where a relative was also caught, it was most often a spouse or a sibling; parents and children were affected less often. Respondents could name more than one relative, and many did. The open-text accounts show the purge sweeping through entire sibling groups, with several brothers or sisters dismissed, prosecuted, or driven to seek asylum abroad.

> Two of my siblings were condemned under the decrees, and the others were caught up in it too. Six of us seven siblings are now refugees, scattered across Europe.

> My son desperately wanted to become a police officer, but he couldn't: the children of those dismissed face 'negative discrimination.'

> My spouse was mobbed at the university and deliberately expelled from her PhD by her advisor.

A second mechanism reached even those relatives who were never themselves dismissed. Nearly three in ten respondents (29.7%) reported that a spouse or child, though holding no KHK status of their own, had faced discrimination because of the respondent's. They described public banks closing off the family's transactions, a spouse pushed out of a doctoral programme, a child refused entry to a profession such as policing on account of a parent's dismissal, a spouse's professional contract terminated. Proximity to a dismissed person had itself become a source of legal and social disadvantage.

This is the logic of guilt by association, and it sits uneasily with two basic principles: that legal consequences should attach to individual conduct, and that family life is protected from arbitrary interference (Article 8 ECHR; Article 17 ICCPR). The effect documented here runs the other way. A single administrative designation radiated outward, drawing spouses, siblings and children into the same web of exclusion as the person first dismissed.

CHAPTER III

Conclusion: Civil Death as Lived Reality

The categories used throughout this study capture what can be counted. The survey's open-ended responses capture much of what they cannot.

Beyond the formal bars and refusals lies a wider field of informal exclusion. Respondents described being isolated by relatives, neighbours and former colleagues; being labelled dangerous, suspicious, or "terrorist" in everyday encounters; and being treated, in their own words, as *second-class* citizens. Much of this never took the form of a written decision. It worked instead through verbal refusals, institutional reluctance, and a general climate of fear in which officials and employers preferred not to be associated with a dismissed person.

> Ostracised by society and stigmatised by the state, we couldn't show any sign of life. We couldn't even claim our rights: we knew we couldn't get a passport, so we never applied for one.

> Removed from the public sector, unable to find private work, with people afraid even to go into business with us, ostracised in our social circles.

> I was in the final stage of my PhD; the committees had all passed. Then no professor came to my final exam. They cut ties as if the crime were mine, and erased five years of work with a stroke of the pen.
> *— a dismissed doctoral candidate*

This informality carries an important consequence for how the survey's figures should be read. A great deal of exclusion never produced a recorded refusal at all, because respondents stopped asking. Anticipating rejection, humiliation, or further scrutiny, many simply did not apply for the jobs, services, benefits, or licences they were entitled to seek. The measurable refusals understate the true reach of the phenomenon, which extends into self-censorship, withdrawal from public life, and a corrosive loss of trust in public institutions.

The open responses also widen the map beyond the thirty listed forms, into public tenders and procurement, public housing schemes, long-suspended pensions, and a range of licensed and informal occupations. They widen it into the family, with accounts of children pressured at school and relationships severed, and into compulsory domains such as military service, where some respondents reported humiliating or degrading treatment.

Taken together, the survey puts empirical flesh on the concept Chapter I set out in the abstract. "Civil death" is no longer only a doctrinal description of what the Emergency Decrees were

designed to produce; it is the reported daily experience of more than sixteen hundred people, nearly a decade on. And because that evidence now exists, the legal assessment advanced in Chapter I need no longer rest on doctrine alone. Each limb of it can be measured against what the survey shows.

Chapter I argued that, even allowing for a genuine public emergency, the post-2016 regime failed the requirements of international human rights law on four counts. The survey substantiates each.

The first was a want of **necessity and proportionality**. The breadth of the purges, the vagueness of the criteria of "membership, affiliation, connection or contact," and the extension of sanctions to hundreds of thousands of people on tenuous or unproven links could not, Chapter I argued, satisfy the test of measures "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" under Article 15 ECHR and Article 4 ICCPR. The respondents bear this out. They are not a narrow category of suspected plotters but a broad cross-section of the public service, dismissed under many different decrees, drawn from every profession and every stage of a career, and the discrimination they report attaches to their KHK status whether or not any court ever found against them. A measure genuinely calibrated to an imminent threat would not fall so indiscriminately nor endure so long after the threat had passed.

The second was **collective punishment and guilt by association**. Chapter I described a model of liability built on organisational proximity rather than personal conduct, corroding individual responsibility and the presumption of innocence. The survey shows that logic operating at the level of the family: more than a third of respondents had a first-degree relative also purged, and nearly three in ten reported that a spouse or child, holding no KHK status of their own, was nonetheless made to suffer for the respondent's. Proximity to a dismissed person had itself become a source of disadvantage. The same substitution of suspicion for proof runs through the criminal data, where respondents were detained and prosecuted on the strength of executive designations and were, in large numbers, ultimately acquitted.

The third was the **permanence** of ostensibly temporary measures. Chapter I observed that turning dismissals, closures, and bans into irreversible statuses blurred the line between temporary derogation and structural constitutional transformation, "normalising the state of emergency." The survey makes that permanence concrete. Acquittal restored nothing: those cleared in the criminal courts remained dismissed all the same. The Code 36 marker followed respondents through every institution, with no temporal limit and no route to rehabilitation. Years after the formal end of the State of Emergency, the exclusion was still in force. The temporary had become permanent in the most literal, lived sense.

The fourth was a deficit of **effective remedies**. Chapter I found the regime incompatible with the minimum procedural guarantees that must survive even a public emergency for want of timely, independent, and adversarial review. Here the survey is at its starkest. The outcome that should have mattered most, a favourable judgment in court, changed nothing: acquittal and non-prosecution left the administrative purge wholly intact because it ran on a track separate from any judicial finding. And the procedural cost fell heavily on the cleared, who reported pre-trial detention of up to two years and prosecutions lasting between four and nine years

before their eventual acquittal (Appendix B), in plain tension with the right to liberty and to trial within a reasonable time under Articles 5 and 6 ECHR. The remedy gap is not an abstraction in this record; it is visible in individual lives.

Read against these findings, the regime cannot be reconciled with derogation law. Even under Article 15 ECHR and Article 4 ICCPR, derogation cannot justify the permanent destruction of civil status, blanket professional bans detached from individualised necessity, stigmatising registries that foreclose social reintegration, or measures that undermine the essence of human dignity. The survey shows that the post-2016 regime did each of these, to a broad and loosely defined group, for years.

What the evidence describes, in the end, is the trajectory Chapter I named: from emergency to **authoritarian constitutionalism**. A formally lawful derogation, grounded at the outset in a genuine crisis, evolved into a comprehensive system of rule by exception. Through the thirty-two Emergency Decrees, the mass dismissal of public servants, and the creation of a de facto status of civil death, the State of Emergency ceased to function as a temporary mechanism of constitutional self-defence and became an instrument of structural political re-engineering. The Turkish case demonstrates the fragility of the derogation framework once judicial oversight is weakened, parliamentary control marginalised, and proportionality displaced by collective suspicion. It stands as a paradigmatic example of how emergency powers, normalised and made permanent, corrode the very foundations of legality, equality, and human dignity that derogation clauses exist to protect. The survey's contribution is to show that this corrosion is not only a matter of legal architecture; a decade on, it is the lived reality of those who were dismissed and of the families made to share their exclusion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Turkish Government

1. **Immediately dismantle the 36/OHAL/KHK administrative blacklisting system.**

The "36/OHAL/KHK" designation in SGK and İŞKUR databases constitutes a permanent, automated stigma operating without court judgment, temporal limit, or mechanism for rehabilitation. Turkey must remove this designation from all state databases and prohibit its use as a basis for differential treatment in employment, finance, or access to services.

2. **Enact an automatic reinstatement procedure for those acquitted or cleared of all charges.**
3. **Ensure immediate retrials in full compliance with *Yalçınkaya v. Turkey* (Grand Chamber, 26 September 2023) and *Yasak v. Turkey* (Grand Chamber, 5 May 2026).**
4. **Repeal all secondary professional prohibitions not grounded in individualised judicial findings.**
5. **End collective punishment of family members and provide reparation.**

The survey documents that nearly three in ten respondents had family members subjected to discrimination—in banking, education, employment, and social services—solely on account of their relative's KHK status. This is incompatible with the principle of personal criminal responsibility and Article 8 ECHR. Turkey must issue binding guidance prohibiting any adverse treatment on the basis of a family member's dismissal and establish a reparations mechanism for the harm caused.

6. **Restore full political and civic rights without condition.**

To Turkey's State Allies, the European Union, and the Council of Europe

1. **Make lifting KHK-related disabilities a specific and non-negotiable condition in all engagement with Turkey.**

The EU — in its accession framework, association agreements, and rule-of-law dialogues — and Turkey's bilateral state partners should explicitly raise the blacklisting system, the failure of the reinstatement mechanism, and secondary professional prohibitions as live human rights concerns requiring concrete, time-bound action.

2. **The Council of Europe must treat *Yalçınkaya* and *Yasak* as structural compliance matters and escalate accordingly.**
3. **The Parliamentary Assembly's rapporteurs on Turkey and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights should conduct a dedicated country visit focusing on the situation of KHK-dismissed persons and publish their findings.**
4. **The EU should make any upgrade in EU-Turkey relations conditional on measurable progress on KHK remediation.**

Progress on customs union modernisation, visa liberalisation, and enhanced cooperation should be made expressly conditional on verifiable steps: removal of the blacklisting designation, enactment of automatic reinstatement for the acquitted, repeal of secondary professional prohibitions, and genuine retrial compliance. These are specific, measurable, legally required actions that Turkey has to date declined to take.

5. EU Member States must ensure adequate protection for dismissed persons seeking asylum or international protection.

KHK dismissal status must be treated as a relevant factor in asylum and subsidiary protection assessments, given the documented risk of re-prosecution and ongoing civic persecution on return. The EU Agency for Asylum should issue updated guidance reflecting the findings of this report and the persistent character of the discrimination those dismissed continue to face.

6. Support independent civil society documentation and litigation.

Organisations documenting and litigating the ongoing consequences of the Emergency Decree purges operate under extreme pressure in Turkey and with severely limited resources internationally. The EU, Council of Europe member states, and bilateral donors should substantially increase funding and institutional support through the European Endowment for Democracy and relevant civil society instruments, recognising systematic documentation as an essential component of accountability.

7. Treat the Turkish case as a paradigm for strengthening the derogation framework under international law.

The Council of Europe's Venice Commission and Parliamentary Assembly, and the UN Human Rights Committee, should draw on the findings of this report — and on the *Yalçınkaya* and *Yasak* judgments — in developing strengthened guidance on the limits of permissible derogation, the requirements of effective remedies in mass dismissal contexts, and the obligations of states to reverse the effects of emergency measures found incompatible with international human rights law.

APPENDIX A

Survey Questionnaire

The survey was administered online via Google Forms between 13 October and 4 November 2025. It comprised eleven core questions and a structured checklist of thirty forms of discrimination. Items 4–7 and 9–11 paired a closed response with an optional open-ended prompt, shown in italics below. The questionnaire was administered in Turkish; the version reproduced here is an English translation.

- Part A — Core Questions

1. Under which numbered State of Emergency Decree (KHK) were you dismissed from public service?
2. What was your profession at the time of dismissal?
3. How many years had you served as a public official at the date of your dismissal?
4. Have you been subjected to any criminal investigation or criminal proceedings?

   If yes, could you briefly explain?
5. Do any of your first-degree relatives (mother, father, spouse, siblings, children) have KHK dismissal status?

   If yes, could you briefly explain?
6. After becoming a KHK-dismissed person, were you able to find a formally registered (socially insured) job?

   If yes, could you briefly describe the circumstances?
7. Have your job applications been rejected, or have you been dismissed from employment due to your KHK status?

   If yes, could you briefly explain?
8. How many of your job applications have been rejected?
9. Have you encountered the code "36/OHAL/KHK" in any public institution?

   If yes, could you briefly explain in what context?
10. Have you been subjected to discrimination in relation to access to public services (such as scholarships, social assistance, vocational training, health care, disability benefits, etc.) due to your KHK status?

    If yes, could you briefly explain?
11. Although your spouse or children are not KHK-dismissed, have they been subjected to discrimination in relation to access to public services because of your KHK status?

    If yes, could you briefly explain?

- Part B — Checklist of Thirty Forms of Discrimination (Question 12)

Respondents were asked: "Have you experienced any of the 30 forms of discrimination listed below?" Multiple selections were permitted. A final open option allowed respondents to describe experiences not captured by the list.

1. Being unable to obtain a passport or travel document
2. Being blacklisted in İŞKUR and SGK databases under the code "36/OHAL/KHK"
3. Facing discrimination when opening a bank account or conducting financial transactions
4. Being unable to work in private educational institutions
5. Being unable to benefit from business development and incentive loans
6. KHK-affiliated persons and their spouses/children being denied General Health Insurance and related healthcare access available to low-income individuals
7. Being unable to benefit from COVID-19 economic support programmes
8. Being unable to attend vocational training courses
9. Facing discrimination in insurance services (e.g. car, earthquake, fire)
10. Being unable to work as a school bus driver
11. Being unable to become a mayor, municipal council member, or village headman (muhtar)
12. Being listed in the Social Assistance Information System (SOYBİS), resulting in discrimination in access to social assistance
13. Being listed as a "suspicious person" by the Union of Turkish Notaries, upon the instruction of the Ministry of Justice
14. Being unable to obtain a business license
15. Being unable to practice law
16. Being listed as a "suspicious person" in the Land Registry and Cadastre Information System (TAKBİS)
17. Facing discrimination during military service
18. Facing discrimination in academic publications
19. Being unable to work in the maritime sector (ships' personnel, etc.)
20. Being unable to work as a workplace physician or occupational safety specialist
21. Being unable to benefit from scientific scholarships
22. Being unable to work as a financial advisor/accountant
23. Facing discrimination in disaster relief assistance
24. Being unable to become a foster family
25. Being unable to work as an architect, engineer, laboratory worker or building inspection technician
26. Being unable to sit for associate professorship examinations
27. Facing discrimination in university admission and tuition fees
28. Facing discrimination in tax practices
29. Being denied admission to medical specialization training
30. Veterinarians being unable to obtain artificial insemination certification or access to agricultural support programmes

Open response: "The discrimination I faced is not listed above" (with space to describe).

APPENDIX B

Pre-trial Detention and Length of Proceedings Among Acquitted Respondents

The tables below set out durations of pre-trial detention and of criminal proceedings reported by respondents who were ultimately acquitted. These details were volunteered by respondents in their open-ended answers; the length of detention and of proceedings was not itself a survey question. The lists are therefore illustrative rather than exhaustive, and the figures cannot be compared against those of respondents who were convicted or whose cases remained open. Participant numbers (e.g. P357) are anonymous identifiers used throughout the report.

All individuals listed in both tables were ultimately acquitted. The accounts are reproduced as respondents described them.

- Table B.1 — Time spent in pre-trial detention or police custody before acquittal

Participant	Time in pre-trial detention or police custody
P357	9 days (police custody)
P146	13 days (police custody)
P1339	15 days (police custody)
P796	1 month
P802	3 months
P398	4 months
P1292	4 months
P642	5 months
P1247	5 months
P387	6 months
P839	6 months
P1093	6 months
P855	7 months
P866	7 months
P167	7 months and 15 days
P133	8 months
P488	8 months
P697	8 months
P871	8 months
P1149	9 months
P89	10 months

Participant	Time in pre-trial detention or police custody
P280	10 months
P663	10 months
P703	10 months
P1463	10 months
P93	11 months
P939	11 months
P1590	11 months
P330	12 months
P1365	12 months
P314	15 months
P773	15 months
P1109	15 months
P727	16 months
P48	18 months
P960	18 months
P723	2 years

- Table B.2 — Length of criminal proceedings ending in acquittal

Participant	Length of criminal proceedings
P1283	4 years
P740	5 years
P149	6 years
P160	6 years
P1119	7 years
P1074	8 years (proceedings still ongoing at the time of the survey)
P1149	8 years
P1339	8 years
P562	8 years
P1517	9 years
P965	9 years
P949	9 years
P856	9 years

Participant	Length of criminal proceedings
P855	9 years
P866	9 years
P757	9 years
P528	9 years

Note. Several respondents appear in both tables, having reported both the length of their detention and the length of their proceedings. Read together, these accounts indicate that pre-trial detention of up to two years and prosecutions lasting between four and nine years were borne by individuals against whom no criminal liability was ultimately established—raising concerns under the right to liberty and the right to trial within a reasonable time (Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights).